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Canada is the member of the G7 countries most dependent on trade. The 
rules-based trading regime under the World Trade Organization (WTO) is 
critical for Canada’s continuing prosperity. The biggest issue currently facing 
the world trading system is the accession of China, which will bring a fifth of 
the world’s population into the system. This will obviously have widespread 
implications for the overall system, which will be of overarching importance 
for Canada. Given this importance and the lifelong interest of David Slater in 
trade issues, this paper focuses on the myriad of issues raised by China’s 
accession to the WTO. 
 The negotiations for China’s accession to the WTO have gone on, albeit 
in fits and starts, for almost 15 years. But as the saying goes, timing is 
everything. If China had joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the negotiations would have been far easier since market access 
under GATT was mainly about border barriers. But since the Uruguay Round 
the concept of market access has been extended to include not only domestic 
regulatory policies but also both substantive and procedural legal issues. The 
barriers to access for service providers stem from laws, regulations, 
administrative actions which impede cross-border trade and factor flows. 
Implicit in this shift embodied in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) is a move away from GATT negative regulation  — what  
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governments must not do — to positive regulation — what govern-ments 
must do. This aspect is now apparent in the WTO’s telecommuni-cations 
reference paper that set out a common framework for the regulation of 
competition in basic telecommunications and is likely to be adopted in other 
sectors. In the case of intellectual property the move to positive regulation is 
more dramatic since the negotiations covered not only standards for domestic 
laws but also detailed provisions for procedures to enforce individual 
(meaning primarily corporate) property rights. But the Round also dealt with 
social regulation, which has grown so rapidly in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries since the 1970s 
that it has been termed “regulatory inflation”. In the area of social regulation 
(covering environment, food safety, etc.) the positive regulatory approach is 
procedural rather than substantive and the model is the western, especially 
American, administrative procedures model, of which more will be said later. 
The WTO rules thus involve commitments for many member countries 
to what is in effect systemic redesign. Further, and in my view most 
importantly, the overarching governing principle of the WTO trading system 
is the western system of law, especially its American version, and the WTO 
houses a supranational juridical system for settlement of disputes, a system 
which is becoming increasingly litigious. 
But the transformation of the system is not the only aspect of timing 
worth noting. The political economy of post-Uruguay Round trade policy has 
also been transformed. The Uruguay Round was a north-south “grand 
bargain”, GATT-type market access for the south, especially in agriculture 
and labour-intensive industries like textiles and clothing, in exchange for their 
acceptance of rules governing the so-called new issues of trade in services 
and intellectual property. The deal required investment in structural 
transformation often with uncertain, long-term returns. Unfortunately though, 
it turned out to be a bum deal in the view of many southern countries and has 
left a wide north-south divide. And that divide has been widening further with 
the demand for the “trade and” (environment and labour) issues by the north, 
largely in response to the new global actors: the NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations). However, not all the NGOs are the ones you see marching on 
TV. Some are technical/legal groups possessing a highly valuable strategic 
asset — policy knowledge — and a number act as a “virtual secretariat” for 
the south. In post-Seattle Geneva, a seemingly paralyzed north is confronted 
by an increasingly proactive south. The credibility and effectiveness of the 
WTO is under serious challenge. Thus the impact of Chinese accession must 
be viewed in this context. 
Since Chinese accession will be arguably among the most significant 
events in the history of the world trading system and is bound to have a  
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profound impact on the system surely both the WTO and the major trading 
countries have undertaken a careful analysis of the subject? Rather than give 
you a straight answer, let me recount a story. A few months age, I was at a 
conference at the University of Minnesota and asked a senior WTO official 
how many people in the secretariat were analyzing the impact of China on the 
operations of the WTO. He grinned (assuming I knew the answer) and said 
two people in the legal division were working “round the clock on technical 
accession matters”. OK, I said, surely you have some studies from Brussels 
or Washington or ..... Nothing, he said, his grin fading. There are lots of 
studies by business groups on the benefits of opening up a market of over a 
billion consumers. And lots of models estimating the impact of Chinese 
liberalization on China and the world. These are studies of improved access 
for goods under the GATT, of course, and provide carefully calibrated 
numbers. (Many of the econometric studies are nearly breathless in 
admiration for the amazing extent and pace of Chinese liberalization and the 
bonanza of welfare gains, albeit with some costs for industries within China 
and many in Asia.) But studies on the WTO system? Alas, there are none.  
So I am treading in unknown territory. And I want to break ranks with 
my fellow economists (except for the growing institutional school) and look at 
Chinese accession through a legal template. I will then put forward some 
necessarily speculative views on the implications of Chinese accession for the 
future of the WTO and end with a policy proposal to facilitate the full and 
effective integration of China into the world trading system. 
 
 
China and Transparency 
 
The WTO is a highly legalized system with a built-in tendency for further 
legalization.
1 It can, for example, be observed in the growing evidentiary 
content of all disputes: panels are now in effect preparing reports less for the 
parties than for the Appellate Board. The requirement for ever-increasing 
amounts of detailed information has only just begun. Imagine what disputes in 
China’s services sector or food safety and risk assessment would entail in 
terms of evidence. Or what about a dispute on subsidies in China’s state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), privatized or not, which could include a demand 
for information on non-performing bank loans or the non-existent “services” 
of subsidiaries or cross-subsidization in telecommunications services or, 
                                                             
1Much of this discussion is from Ostry (1998, pp. 1-22). See also Groombridge 
and Barfield (1999).  
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technology transfer conditions for foreign investors, or¼. But this aspect of 
so-called transparency is by no means the only problem. Far more important 
over the long run is the fundamental aspect of “transparency” as a pillar of 
the GATT and now the WTO, a pillar as important as non-discrimination in 
the origins of the system. This needs some explanation. 
The drafting of the Charter of the International Trade Organization 
(ITO), which was to have been a part of the Bretton Woods institutional 
architecture, coincided with a new development in the American legal system, 
the establishment of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in 1946. The 
APA stemmed from the expansion of the role of government as a result of the 
New Deal and the war. It was, in effect, designed to constrain the 
discretionary power of bureaucrats. When the ITO died, the main elements of 
the APA, which had been included in the Charter, became article X of the 
GATT entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”. No 
founding member objected, probably because all industrial-ized countries had 
adapted similar legislation as a result of the expanded role of government. 
And all therefore required the establishment of norms to control what 
bureaucrats do and how they do it. However, it is important to underline that 
the U.S. approach was different in several respects in placing more emphasis 
on independent regulatory agencies with quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative 
functions; an emphasis on the right of notice and comment; freedom of 
information; and judicial review. The U.S. approach (more adversarial and 
fact-intensive than the European) was reflected in article X, although it is 
weaker than the APA in speaking of the desirability rather than the necessity 
of independent tribunals and judicial review, probably as a result of 
compromise in the negotiating process. In any case, it was hardly a major 
item in the negotiations because the GATT’s focus was on border barriers, 
which are more obviously “transparent”. 
The Tokyo Round nudged transparency and legalization a bit further but 
the Uruguay Round introduced a sea change. So, for example, “transparency” 
— the word actually appears in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) — now requires the publication of laws, 
regulations and the mode of administration in services as well as detailed 
enforcement procedures in TRIPS. The Accession Protocol of China, of 
course, reflects these changes, including requirements on the administration of 
the trade regime and sections on transparency and judicial review. 
Can China deliver on these requirements? The short answer would be not 
yet — and it is not clear when. Thus, transparency covers: publication of 
relevant laws and regulations; right of comment before implementation; 
enforcement only of those laws and regulations published; creation of a single 
inquiry point with a time limit for response. Unfortunately, while Beijing may  
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be able to publish all central government laws, etc. it is widely agreed that 
many (an unknown number) of relevant state laws will not (cannot) be 
covered nor will the unpublished “normative documents”, a leftover from the 
old regime, still in use by local and state officials. More broadly, the multi-
layered complexity of the evolving Chinese legal system — including several 
administrative laws — make it impossible to conform to WTO transparency. 
The Chinese laws at present lack specified procedures to constrain 
bureaucratic discretion and include no mandatory right of comment. Finally, 
the requirement for judicial review, which has been watered down in recent 
negotiations, faces the basic problem that there is no separation of powers in 
the constitution and therefore no concept of an independent judiciary. Indeed 
the Chinese Communist Party has the final say on judicial appointments. As 
several Chinese legal experts have noted, the Chinese tradition regards law as 
an instrument to maintain social discipline or promote policy or sovereign 
rights — rule by law not rule of law. And while that is certainly changing, the 
instrumentalist approach to law is still widely prevalent. 
The concept of instrumentalism is deep-seated. Thus, the pervasiveness 
of local protectionism stems from the decentralization of the economic reform 
process launched in the 1980s. There was no view of systemic reform but 
rather ad hoc pragmatic evolution. The same approach applies to legal 
reform. Law is an instrument of policy: there is a large and growing body of 
legal rules for domestic and foreign transactions and government administra-
tion. There is, however, no legal system, no protection against arbitrary and 
unpredictable government decisions. 
But many, including economists and corporations, would say: So what? 
There will be an endogenous demand for the rule of law from Chinese 
business and lawyers as it becomes clear that the costs of relations-based 
corporate governance, the norm in China, rises astronomically with the rapid 
spread of economic liberalization. So guanxi (connections) is a wasting asset 
and the rule of law is far less costly and more effective. Thus it is not the 
demand from the WTO, but the demand from business itself that will make 
the rule of law the governance norm in China. This issue is now the subject 
of debate among institutional economists and it is all very interesting. But 
guanxi is still prevalent, foreign corporations are actively engaged in forging 
relations-based networks, and during the transition from one to the other 
there seems to be what some have described as chaos. And there is growing 
evidence that corruption and red tape, that is, lack of transparency and the 
rule of law, have a significant negative impact on foreign direct investment 
and on economic growth.
2 So while obviously the transition will be lengthy, 
                                                             
2See Shang-Jin Wei (2000, pp. 303-346); and Shleifer (2000, pp. 347-351) for a  
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the need for some clearly delineated time-certain road map will be of crucial 
importance both for sustained economic liberalization and sustained growth in 
China, and also for the WTO. I will make a proposal for such a transition 





Impact of Chinese Accession on the WTO 
 
 
In the light of the complexity and difficulty of the profound institutional 
change required if China is to abide by its WTO so-called transparency 
commitments it is worth noting that in the accession negotiations the United 
States, which had demanded a 16-year transition recently settled for eight 
years. In an article in Fortune magazine, Senior Statesman Lee Kuan Yew of 
Singapore notes the amazing transformation of China since 1978, but argues 
that to change the “mindset” of the Chinese rulers will require replacement by 
a new generation mainly educated abroad. He estimates this will take “20 to 
30 years” (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p. 334). So maybe the WTO members 
know something that has escaped the notice of Lee Kuan Yew? 
                                                                                                                                        
fuller discussion of this point. 
Seen through the prism of the legal template, the most significant impact 
of Chinese accession on the WTO will be on the dispute-settlement 
mechanism. I have already noted the endogenous legalization process at work 
and its increasingly evidentiary-intensive nature, which could create serious 
problems of access to reliable information in China. But it is also worth noting 
that the pressure from the United States and North American NGOs for the 
right to present  amicus curiae briefs to both dispute panels and/or the 
Appellate Board is unlikely to abate. Indeed, a new rallying cry has been 
provided: “participatory legalism” (Shell, 1996, p. 370). Moreover there is 
now a major drive by some academic lawyers and NGOs to promote the 
primacy of customary international law over international trade law in the 
field of the environment as well as human rights (Ostry, 2001). Considering 
that China has just over 100,000 lawyers or about one for every 11,000 
people compared with one per 300 in the United States, participatory legalism 
and endless arcane debates over whether or not customary international law 
should override the WTO may be a rather difficult game for China to play, let 
alone to win. (Strangely enough, however, it was reported in the Financial 
Times [2000, p. 8] that last year China decided to sharply reduce the number  
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of new lawyers because of concern over their growing potential for 
disruptiveness.) 
So one view of the impact of Chinese accession expressed in the 
corridors in Geneva is that a flood of disputes could overwhelm the already 
over-burdened system. There is serious concern that China would likely 
regard these actions as political and, to save face, simply reject the process 
itself. Indeed, as many China scholars have underlined, Chinese foreign 
policy is deeply state-centric and protection of sovereignty is at its core. A 
Chinese rejection or attack on the dispute-settlement mechanism would 
seriously undermine its credibility. 
But another view shared by some, especially multinational corporations 
with experience in China, is that there will be very few, if any, disputes. 
Businesses will be fearful of complaining to their governments because of 
retaliation by Chinese officials. They would prefer informal behind-the-scene, 
government-to-government talks so that some new deal could be worked out. 
This scenario would involve a two-track trading system: one set of 
transparent dispute-settlement rules for all WTO members except China and 
another set of opaque bilateral arrangements for China. Other countries — 
India, for example — are likely to regard this as unfair to put it mildly. 
Both scenarios could threaten the long-term viability of the WTO. Both 
would involve an indefinite period of “partial integration” for the Chinese — 
to be and not to be. If that is a suggested answer it should be directly con-
fronted. Surely a longer transition period, with clearly specified monitoring 
mechanisms and benchmarks as well as provisions for coordinated and 
targeted legal training assistance would be a more effective approach? A 
proposal along these lines will be described below. But one final point about 
impact requires exploration. 
What impact will China have on the north-south gridlock over a new 
round of negotiations? I speculate that China will be pragmatic and carefully 
weigh the costs and benefits for China. Given the formidable structural 
change that will ensue from WTO accession — especially the impact on 
China’s 900 million rural population and the widening rural-urban and inland-
coastal income inequality — it seems highly unlikely that further liberalization 
would be welcome, whatever the long-term welfare gains. Hence China is 
unlikely to be an active proponent of new negotiations. China sees itself as a 
leader of developing countries and there is likely to be some jousting with 
India over this high profile role. But on balance it seems unlikely that Chinese 
accession will be a positive factor in bridging the north-south divide. Perhaps 
a more innovation transition mechanism could help? 
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A New Transition Mechanism 
 
 
The Chinese accession negotiations with the two great trading powers — the 
European Union and the United States — have focused almost exclusively on 
market access for their (often competing) corporations. This is under-
standable, if regrettable, because au fond institutional or systemic issues are 
not a high priority. The alternative to a rules-based system is a power-based 
system and, unlike the postwar period when a combination of idealism and 
the Cold War fostered the creation of the international economic architecture, 
in today’s post-Cold War environment commercial values rule supreme. But 
the same is not (or should not be) true for middle powers like Canada for 
whom a rules-based system is crucial to providing stability or at least reducing 
uncertainty. Canada played a lead role in the Uruguay Round in mobilizing 
middle-power coalitions that were effective in both launching and sustaining 
the extraordinarily difficult negotiations. And it was a Canadian proposal that 
created the WTO. The Chinese accession will have major consequences for 
the WTO and the world trading system. A middle-power coalition led by 
Canada could help mitigate the negative impact of accession both on the 
WTO and the Chinese reform process. 
The accession protocol in Geneva already includes the concept of 
transition periods of varying length for different parts of the liberalization 
commitments. What is required is to house these specifics in an overall 
transition framework which would be time-certain; include specified 
benchmarks for review at designated dates by a WTO committee, which 
might take the form of either a new committee for economies in transition or 
of the existing Trade Policy Review (Groombridge and Barfield, 1999, 
pp. 76-81); and would result in full WTO membership at the end of the 
period when the TPRM certified full adherence to the transition protocol. To 
ensure the credibility of this mechanism the committee should have the right 
to apply sanctions for a specified period if China failed to deliver the 
commitments at any of the designated benchmarks. 
This approach to accession (which should also apply to Russia where the 
institutional underpinning is far more chaotic and other transition economies 
in waiting) should be coordinated with World Bank programs. The technical 
assistance should be jointly supplied by the two institutions although this 
would require an increase in WTO training and legal resources. In addition, 
since China’s integration into the WTO will involve major restructuring of the 
state owned enterprises; radical reform of the banking system; and the need 
to create an effective social safety net, coordination with Bank programs to  
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facilitate this massive structural change would help ensure the sustainability of 
both the domestic reform and the liberalization process.  
In addition to this more comprehensive transition arrangement, it would 
also be essential to include specific  mechanisms to secure relevant 
information and to encourage mediation and negotiation for the settlement of 
seriously contentious disputes. But once again, it is important not to create a 
two-tier system in the WTO and thus the transitional arrangements with 
respect to dispute settlement should be time-certain in duration. But since the 
issue of the increasing litigiousness of the WTO dispute mechanism is a 
broader issue that the Chinese accession will amplify but does not create, it is 
likely to be discussed in the context of negotiations along with other issues of 
structural reform of the institution. Perhaps China could play a more positive 
role in the negotiations by working with other countries, like Canada, in 
strengthening the first post-Cold War institution and guardian of the rules-
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